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Abstract 
 Even	  though	  adverse	  selection	  pervades	  markets	  for	  real	  goods	  and	  financial	  assets,	  equilibrium	  in	  such	  markets	  is	  not	  well	  understood.	  What	  are	  the	  properties	  of	  equilibrium	  in	  dynamic	  markets	  for	  lemons?	  What	  determines	  the	  liquidity	  of	  a	  good?	  Which	  market	  structures	  perform	  better,	  decentralized	  ones,	  in	  which	  trade	  is	  bilateral	  and	  prices	  are	  negotiated,	  or	  centralized	  ones,	  in	  which	  trade	  is	  multilateral	  and	  agents	  are	  price-­‐takers?	  Is	  there	  a	  role	  for	  government	  intervention?	  We	  show	  that	  when	  the	  horizon	  is	  finite	  and	  frictions	  are	  small,	  decentralized	  markets	  are	  more	  liquid	  and	  perform	  better	  than	  centralized	  markets.	  Moreover,	  the	  surplus	  realized	  is	  above	  the	  static	  competitive	  surplus,	  and	  decreases	  as	  the	  horizon	  grows	  larger,	  approaching	  the	  static	  competitive	  surplus	  as	  the	  horizon	  becomes	  infinite	  even	  if	  frictions	  are	  non-­‐negligible.	  Subsidies	  on	  low	  quality	  or	  taxes	  on	  high	  quality	  raise	  surplus.	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Notation
A Market for Lemons
 : the goods quality,  2 fH;Lg:
u : value to buyers of a unit of  -quality.
c : cost to sellers of  -quality.
q : fraction of sellers of  -quality.
t: a date at which the market is open, t 2 f1;. . . ; Tg:
: tradersdiscount factor.
u(q) = quH + (1  q)uL:
q: =
cH   uL
uH   uL , i.e., u(q) = c
H .
S: = mL(uL   cL).
q^: =
cH   cL
uH   cL , i.e., u(q^)  c
H = (1  q^)(uL   cL).
~S: =

mL +mH (1  q^) (uL   cL):
A Decentralized Market for Lemons
rt : reservation price at date t of sellers of  -quality.
t : probability that a seller of  -quality who is matched at date t trades.
mt : stock of  -quality sellers in the market at date t:
qt : fraction of  -quality sellers in the market at date t:
V t : expected utility of a seller of  -quality at date t:
V Bt : expected utility of a buyer at date t:
SDE: surplus in a decentralized market equilibrium see equation (2).
t : probability of a price o¤er of r

t at date t:
lt : liquidity of the  -quality good at date t.
A Dynamic Competitive Market for Lemons
st : supply of  -quality good at date t:
ut: expected value to buyers of a unit supplied at date t:
dt: demand at date t:
SCE: surplus in a dynamic competitive equilibrium see equation (3).
T : smallest integer t such that t 1(cH   cL)  uL   cL:eT : smallest integer t such that t 1(uH   cL)  uL   cL:
1 Introduction
Akerlofs nding that the competitive equilibrium of a market for lemons may be
ine¢ cient is a cornerstone of the theory of markets with adverse selection. Since
adverse selection pervades real good markets (e.g., cars, housing, labor) as well as
markets for nancial assets (e.g., insurance, stocks), this result has signicant welfare
implications, and calls for research on fundamental questions that remain open: How
do dynamic markets for lemons perform? Which market structures perform better,
decentralized ones, in which trade is bilateral and prices are negotiated, or centralized
ones, in which trade is multilateral and agents are price-takers? What is the role of
frictions in alleviating adverse selection? What determines the liquidity of a good?
Is there a role for government intervention? Our analysis provides answers to these
questions.
We consider a simple market in which there is an equal measure of buyers and
sellers initially present, and there is no further entry over time. Sellers di¤er in the
quality of the unit of the good they hold, which may be high or low. A seller knows
the quality of his good, but quality is unknown to buyers prior to purchase. Buyers
are homogeneous and value each quality more highly than sellers. We assume that
the expected value to buyers of a random unit is below the cost of a high quality
unit, since in this case only low quality units trade in Akerlofs (static) competitive
equilibrium, i.e., the lemons problem arises.
We rst study the performance of decentralized markets for lemons in which trade
is bilateral and time consuming, and buyers and sellers bargain over prices. These
features are common in markets for real goods and nancial assets. We characterize
the unique decentralized market equilibrium, and we identify the dynamics of transac-
tion prices, trading patterns, the liquidities of the di¤erent qualities, and the market
composition (i.e., the fractions of units of the di¤erent qualities in the market). Also,
we study the asymptotic properties of equilibrium as frictions vanish. Using our char-
acterization of market equilibrium, we identify policy interventions that are welfare
improving. Finally, we compare the performance of decentralized and centralized
dynamic markets.
In the decentralized market we study, at each date a fraction of the buyers and
sellers remaining in the market are randomly paired. In every pair, the buyer makes
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a take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er. If the seller accepts, then the agents trade at that
price and exit the market. If the seller rejects the o¤er, then the agents split and both
remain in the market at the next date. In this market there are trading frictions
since meeting a partner is time-consuming and traders discount future gains.
In this market, equilibrium dynamics are non-stationary and involve a delicate
balance: At each date, the price o¤ers of the buyers must be optimal given the sellers
reservation prices, the market composition, and the buyerspayo¤ to remaining in the
market. While the market composition is determined by past price o¤ers, the sellers
reservation prices are determined by future price o¤ers. Thus, even if the horizon is
nite a market equilibrium cannot be computed recursively.
We begin by studying the equilibria of decentralized markets that open over a
nite horizon. Perishable goods such as fresh fruit or event tickets, as well as nancial
assets such as (put or call) options or thirty-year bonds, are noteworthy examples.
We show that equilibrium is unique when frictions are small, and we identify the key
features of equilibrium dynamics: at the rst date, both a low price (accepted only
by low quality sellers) and negligible prices (rejected by both types of sellers) are
o¤ered; at the last date, both a high price (accepted by both types of sellers) and a
low price are o¤ered; and at all the intervening dates, all three types of prices high,
low and negligible are o¤ered. Since some o¤ers are rejected, trade involves delay.
In contrast to the static competitive equilibrium, some high quality units trade while
not all low quality units trade.
Remarkably, the surplus realized in the decentralized market equilibrium exceeds
the surplus realized in the static competitive equilibrium: the gain realized from
trading high quality units more than o¤sets the loss resulting from trading low quality
units with delay. Moreover, the surplus realized increases as frictions decrease, and
thus decentralized markets yield more than the competitive surplus even in the limit
as frictions vanish. Surprisingly, in the limit there is trade only at the rst and last
dates, and the market is completely illiquid at all intervening dates (i.e., buyers o¤er
negligible prices).
A decentralized market that operates over an innite horizon has multiple equi-
libria. Our analysis focuses on the equilibrium that is obtained as the limit of the
sequence of equilibria of increasingly long nite-horizon markets. In this equilibrium,
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at the rst date buyers make low and negligible price o¤ers, and at every date there-
after buyers make only high and negligible price o¤ers in proportions that do not
change over time. We show that all units trade eventually, although the expected
delay becomes innite as frictions vanish. In contrast to prior results in the literature,
each trader obtains his static competitive payo¤ even when frictions are signicant.
Thus, the cost of delay of trading low quality units exactly equals the surplus realized
from trading high quality units.
Our characterization of decentralized market equilibrium yields insights into the
determinants of market liquidity and the e¤ectiveness of alternative policies designed
to increase market e¢ ciency. We take the liquidity of a quality to be the ease with
which a unit of that quality is sold, i.e., the probability it trades. In markets that
open over a nite horizon, we show that the liquidity of high quality decreases as
traders become more patient and, counter-intuitively, as the probability of meeting
a partner increases. Indeed, as noted earlier, as frictions vanish trade freezes at all
but the rst and the last date. In markets that open over an innite horizon, the
liquidity of each quality decreases as traders become more patient, and is una¤ected
by the probability of meeting a partner.
Policy intervention may alleviate or aggravate the adverse selection problem. A
subsidy on low quality increases the liquidity of high quality units and raises net
surplus (i.e., surplus net of the present value cost of the subsidy). As frictions vanish,
the subsidy raises net surplus when the horizon is nite, but it has no e¤ect on net
surplus (i.e., it amounts to a pure transfer to low quality sellers) when the horizon is
innite.
Not every subsidy is welfare enhancing. In markets that open over a nite horizon,
a subsidy on high quality reduces the net surplus when frictions are su¢ ciently small.
In markets that open over an innite horizon, a subsidy on high quality is completely
wasteful as it reduces the net surplus by the present value cost of the subsidy.
Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium
In order to evaluate the impact of market micro-structure on performance, we
also study dynamic markets in which trade is centralized and prices clear the market
at each date. In markets that open over a nite horizon, we show that if traders are
patient, then in every dynamic competitive equilibrium all low quality units trade
3
at the rst date and no high quality units ever trade. Hence the surplus realized is
the same as in the static competitive equilibrium. Thus, when the horizon is nite,
decentralized markets (which yield more than the static competitive surplus) perform
better than centralized markets.
In a centralized market in which traders are su¢ ciently impatient, or in which the
horizon is innite, there are dynamic competitive equilibria in which all low quality
units trade immediately at a low price and all high quality units trade with delay at a
high price. These separating equilibria, in which di¤erent qualities trade at di¤erent
dates, yield a surplus greater than the static competitive surplus. Consequently, when
the horizon is innite, centralized markets perform better than decentralized markets
(which, as noted earlier, yield the static competitive surplus).
We show that, as frictions vanish, the surplus at the most e¢ cient separating
equilibrium of a centralized market equals the surplus in the equilibrium of a decen-
tralized market that opens over a nite horizon. Intuitively this result holds since the
same incentive constraints operate in both markets. In this separating dynamic com-
petitive equilibrium high quality trades with su¢ ciently long delay that low quality
sellers are willing to trade immediately at a low price rather than waiting to trade
at a high price. Likewise, in a decentralized market equilibrium high price o¤ers
are made with a su¢ ciently small probability that low quality sellers are willing to
immediately accept a low price, rather than waiting for a high price.
Related Literature
Our work relates to a strand of literature that examines the mini-micro founda-
tions of competitive equilibrium. This literature has established that decentralized
trade of homogeneous goods tends to yield competitive outcomes when trading fric-
tions are small see, e.g., Gale (1987, 1996) or Binmore and Herrero (1988) when
bargaining is under complete information, and Moreno and Wooders (2002) and Ser-
rano (2002) when bargaining is under incomplete information.
More recent work has studied decentralized markets with adverse selection. Moreno
and Wooders (2010) studies markets with stationary entry, and nds that payo¤s are
competitive as frictions vanish. For the one time entry case, on which the present
paper focuses, Blouin (2003) studies a market that opens over an innite horizon in
which only one of three exogenously given prices may emerge from bargaining, and
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nds that equilibrium payo¤s are not competitive. In contrast, in markets open over
an innite horizon, we nd that payo¤s are competitive even when frictions are not
negligible. An essential feature of our model, which explains the di¤ering result, is
that prices are fully endogenous. Camargo and Lester (2011) study a market where
traders have stochastic discount rates that are bounded away from one and vary ran-
domly from one date to the next. (In contrast, in our setting traders have a xed
discount rate, and we focus on discount rates that are near one.) They assume that
buyers may o¤er only one of two exogenously given prices, and they nd that all units
trade in nite time.
Several other recent papers study the role of public information in overcoming the
adverse selection problem. Kim (2011) studies a continuous time version of the model
of Moreno and Wooders (2010), and shows that if buyers observe the length of time a
seller has been in the market, or the number of times a seller has been matched in the
past, then market equilibria are more e¢ cient than when this information is absent.
Bilancini and Boncinelli (2011) study a market for lemons with nitely many buyers
and sellers, and show that if the number of sellers in the market is public information,
then in equilibrium all units trade in nite time.
Lauermann andWolinsky (2011) explore the role of trading rules in a search model
with adverse selection, and show that information is aggregated more e¤ectively in
auctions than under sequential search by an informed buyer. Morris and Shin (2012)
show that when traders coordinate their participation decisions, even a small amount
of adverse selection may have a corrosive e¤ect on market condence and lead to
outcomes with bad welfare properties.
Our paper relates to a second strand of literature that studies competitive equilib-
rium in dynamic markets. Wooders (1998) studies markets with homogeneous goods.
Janssen and Roy (2002), for markets with adverse selection and a continuum of qual-
ities, show that dynamic competitive equilibria exist and involve all qualities trading
in nite time, with the lowest qualities trading rst and the highest qualities trading
last. In our setting, when the horizon is nite a dynamic competitive equilibrium as
they dene it may not exist. However, when as in their setting the horizon is in-
nite, we identify a separating dynamic competitive equilibrium that has analogous
features.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our market for lemons,
Section 3 studies decentralized markets, and Section 4 studies centralized markets.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 A Market for Lemons
Consider a market for an indivisible commodity whose quality can be either high (H)
or low (L). There is a positive measure of buyers and sellers. The measure of sellers
with a unit of quality  2 fH;Lg is m > 0. For simplicity, we assume that the
measure of buyers (mB) is equal to the measure of sellers, i.e., mB = mH +mL. Each
buyer wants to purchase a single unit of the good. Each sellers owns a single unit
of the good. A seller knows the quality of his good, but quality is unobservable to
buyers.
Preferences are characterized by values and costs: the value to a buyer of a unit
of high (low) quality is uH (uL); the cost to a seller of a unit of high (low) quality is
cH (cL). Thus, if a buyer and a seller trade at the price p; the buyer obtains a utility
of u  p and the seller obtains a utility of p  c, where u = uH and c = cH if the unit
traded is of high quality, and u = uL and c = cL if it is of low quality. A buyer or
seller who does not trade obtains a utility of zero.
We assume that both buyers and sellers value high quality more than low quality
(i.e., uH > uL and cH > cL), and that buyers value each quality more highly than
sellers (i.e., uH > cH and uL > cL). Also we restrict attention to markets in which
the lemons problem arises; that is, we assume that the fraction of sellers of  -quality
in the market, denoted by
q :=
m
mH +mL
;
is such that the expected value to a buyer of a randomly selected unit of the good,
given by
u(qH) := qHuH + qLuL,
is below the cost of high quality, cH . Equivalently, we may state this assumption as
q :=
cH   uL
uH   uL > q
H :
Note that q > qH implies cH > uL:
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Therefore, we assume throughout that uH > cH > uL > cL and q > qH : Under
these parameter restrictions only low quality trades in the unique competitive equi-
librium, even though there are gains to trade for both qualities see Figure 1. For
future reference, we describe this equilibrium in Remark 1 below.
1
cL
uL
cH
uH
u(qH)
Figure 1: cH>u(qH)>uL
1-qH
supply
demand
Remark 1. The market has a unique static competitive equilibrium. In equilibrium
all low quality units trade at the price uL, and no high quality unit trades. Thus, the
surplus,
S = mL(uL   cL); (1)
is captured by low quality sellers.
3 A Decentralized Market for Lemons
In this section we study the market described in Section 2 when trade is decentralized.
We assume that the market is open for T consecutive dates. All traders are present at
the market open, and there is no further entry. Traders discount utility at a common
rate  2 (0; 1), i.e., if a unit of quality  trades at date t and price p, then the buyer
obtains a utility of t 1(u  p) and the seller obtains a utility of t 1(p c ). At each
date every buyer (seller) in the market meets a randomly selected seller (buyer) with
probability  2 (0; 1). In each pair, the buyer o¤ers a price at which to trade. If the
o¤er is accepted by the seller, then the agents trade and both leave the market. If
the o¤er is rejected by the seller, then the agents split and both remain in the market
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at the next date. A trader who is unmatched in the current date also remains in the
market at the next date. An agent observes only the outcomes of his own matches.
In this market, a pure strategy for a buyer is a sequence of price o¤ers (p1; : : : ; pT ) 2
RT+. A pure strategy for a seller is a sequence of reservation prices r = (r1; : : : ; rT ) 2
RT+; where rt is the smallest price that the seller accepts at date t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg.1
The strategies of buyers may be described by a sequence  = (1; : : : ; T ), where
t is a c.d.f. with support on R+ specifying the probability distribution over price
o¤ers at date t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg. Given , the maximum expected utility of a seller of
quality  2 fH;Lg at date t  T is dened recursively as
V t = max
x2R+


Z 1
x
(pt   c ) dt(pt) +

1  
Z 1
x
dt(pt)

V t+1

;
where V T+1 = 0. In this expression, the payo¤ to a seller of quality  who receives
a price o¤er pt is pt   c if pt is at least his reservation price x, and it is V t+1; his
continuation utility, otherwise. Since all sellers of quality  have the same maximum
expected utility, then their equilibrium reservation prices are identical. Therefore we
restrict attention to strategy distributions in which all sellers of quality  2 fH;Lg
use the same sequence of reservation prices r 2 RT+.
Let (; rH ; rL) be a strategy distribution. For t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg; the probability that
a matched seller of quality  2 fH;Lg trades, denoted by t , is
t =
Z 1
rt
dt:
The stock of sellers of quality  in the market at date t+ 1; denote by mt+1, is
mt+1 = (1  t )mt ;
where m1 = m
 : The fraction of sellers of quality  in the market at date t, denoted
by qt , is
qt =
mt
mHt +m
L
t
:
The maximum expected utility of a buyer at date t  T is dened recursively as
V Bt = max
x2R+
8<: X
2fH;Lg
qt I(x; r

t )(u
   x) +
0@1   X
2fH;Lg
qt I(x; r

t )
1A V Bt+1
9=; ;
1Ignoring, as we do, that a trader may condition his actions on the history of his prior matches
is inconsequential see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), pages 154-162.
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where V BT+1 = 0. Here I(x; y) is the indicator function whose value is 1 if x  y; and
0 otherwise. In this expression, the payo¤ to a buyer who o¤ers the price x is u   x
when matched to a  -quality seller who accepts the o¤er (i.e., I(x; rt ) = 1), and it is
V Bt+1, her continuation utility, otherwise.
A strategy distribution (; rH ; rL) is a decentralized market equilibrium (DE) if
for each t 2 f1;. . . ; Tg:
(DE:) rt   c = V t+1 for  2 fH;Lg; and
(DE:B) for every pt in the support of t we have

X
2fH;Lg
qt I(pt; r

t )(u
   pt) +
0@1   X
2fH;Lg
qt I(pt; r

t )
1A V Bt+1 = V Bt :
Condition DE: ensures that each type  seller is indi¤erent between accepting or
rejecting an o¤er of his reservation price. Condition DE:B ensures that price o¤ers
that are made with positive probability are optimal.
The surplus realized in a decentralized market equilibrium can be calculated as
SDE = mBV B1 +m
HV H1 +m
LV L1 . (2)
Proposition 1 establishes basic properties of decentralized market equilibria.
Proposition 1. Assume that T <1; and let (; rH ; rL) be a DE. Then for all t:
(1.1) rHt = c
H > rLt , V
H
t = 0, and q
H
t+1  qHt .
(1.2) Only the high price pt = cH , or the low price pt = rLt ; or negligible prices
pt < r
L
t may be o¤ered with positive probability.
The intuition for these results is straightforward: Since buyers make price o¤ers,
they keep sellers at their reservation prices.2 Since agents who do not trade obtain
a zero payo¤, then sellersreservation prices at date T are equal to their costs, i.e.,
rT = c
 . Thus, buyers never o¤er a price above cH at T , and therefore the expected
utility of high quality sellers at T is zero, i.e., V HT = 0: Hence r
H
T 1 = c
H : Also,
since delay is costly (i.e.,  < 1), low quality sellers accept price o¤ers below cH ;
2This is a version of the Diamond Paradox in our context.
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i.e., rLT 1 < c
H . A simple induction argument shows that rHt = c
H > rLt for all t.
Obviously, any price above rHt (accepted by both types of sellers) or in the interval
(rLt ; r
H
t ) (accepted only by low quality sellers) is suboptimal and is therefore made
with probability zero. Moreover, since rHt > r
L
t then the proportion of high quality
sellers in the market (weakly) increases over time (i.e., qHt+1  qHt ) as low quality
sellers (who accept o¤ers of both rHt and r
L
t ) exit the market at either the same or a
faster rate than high quality sellers (who only accept o¤ers of rHt ).
In a decentralized market equilibrium a buyer may o¤er: (i) a high price, p =
rHt = c
H , which is accepted by both types of sellers, thus getting a unit of high
quality with probability qHt and of low quality with probability q
L
t = 1   qHt ; or (ii)
a low price p = rLt , which is accepted by low quality sellers and rejected by high
quality sellers, thus trading only if the seller in the match has a unit of low quality;
or (iii) a negligible price, p < rLt ; which is rejected by both types of sellers. In order to
complete the description of a decentralized market equilibrium we need to determine
the probabilities with which each of these three price o¤ers are made.
Let (; rH ; rL) be a market equilibrium. Recall that t is the probability that a
matched  -quality seller trades at date t (i.e., gets an o¤er greater than or equal to
rt ). For  2 fH;Lg denote by t the probability of a price o¤er equal to rt : Since
prices greater than cH are o¤ered with probability zero by Proposition 1, then the
probability of a high price o¤er (i.e., an o¤er of rHt = c
H) is Ht = 
H
t . And since
prices in the interval (rLt ; r
H
t ) are o¤ered with probability zero, then the probability
of a low price o¤er (i.e., an o¤er of rLt ) is 
L
t = 
L
t   Ht : Hence the probability of a
negligible price o¤er is 1  (Ht + Lt ) = 1  Lt .
Henceforth we ignore the distribution of negligible price o¤ers, which is inconse-
quential, and describe a DE by a collection (H ; L; rH ; rL). Proposition 2 establishes
some simple properties of equilibrium price o¤ers.
Proposition 2. Assume that T <1; and let (H ; L; rH ; rL) be a DE. Then:
(2.1) At every date t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg either high or low prices are o¤ered with positive
probability, i.e., Ht + 
L
t > 0.
(2.2) At date 1 high prices are o¤ered with probability zero, i.e., H1 = 0:
(2.3) At date T negligible prices are o¤ered with probability zero, i.e., 1 HT  LT = 0.
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The intuition for (2.2) is clear: Since the expected utility of a random unit in the
market at date 1 is less than cH by assumption, then high price o¤ers are suboptimal;
i.e., H1 = 0. Likewise, the intuition for (2.3) is simple: At date T the sellers
reservation prices are equal to their costs. Hence a buyer obtains a positive payo¤ by
o¤ering the low price. Since a buyer who does not trade obtains zero, then negligible
price o¤ers are suboptimal, i.e., HT + 
L
T = 1.
The intuition for (2.1) is a bit more involved: Suppose, for example, that all buyers
make negligible o¤ers at date t, i.e., Ht = 
L
t = 0: Let t
0 be the rst date following t
where a buyer makes a non-negligible price o¤er. Since there is no trade between t
and t0, then the distribution of qualities is the same at t and t0; i.e., qHt = q
H
t0 . Thus,
an impatient buyer is better o¤ by o¤ering at date t the price she o¤ers at t0; which
implies that negligible prices are suboptimal at t; i.e., Ht + 
L
t = 1: Hence 
H
t > 0
and/or Lt > 0:
In a decentralized market that opens for a single date, i.e., T = 1; the sellers
reservation prices are their costs. Thus, (2.2) and (2.3) imply that only low price
o¤ers are made (i.e., H1 = 0 and 
L
1 = 1) and only low quality trades. We state
this result in Remark 2 below. When T = 1; in contrast to the static competitive
equilibrium (see Remark 1), in the DE buyers capture the surplus.
Remark 2. If T = 1, then the unique DE is (H ; L; rH ; rL) = (0; 1; cH ; cL). Hence
all matched low quality sellers trade at the price cL, and none of the high quality
sellers trade. Tradersexpected utilities are V B1 = (u
L  cL) and V H1 = V L1 = 0, and
the surplus, SDE = mL(uL   cL), is captured by buyers.
Write
q^ :=
cH   cL
uH   cL ;
i.e., in a market that opens for a single date q^ is the fraction of high quality sellers
that makes a buyer indi¤erent between an o¤er of cH and an o¤er of cL. It is easy to
see that q < q^: Since qH < q by assumption, then qH < q^.
Proposition 3 below establishes that a market that opens for two or more dates
has a decentralized market equilibrium which is identied by some basic properties
of price o¤ers. (Precise expressions for the reservation prices and the probabilities of
high and low price o¤ers in this equilibrium are provided in the Appendix.) Since
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cH > uL > cL and q^ < 1, the assumptions of Proposition 3 hold when frictions are
small, i.e., when  and  are close to one.
Proposition 3. If 1 < T < 1 and frictions are small (i.e., (cH   uL) > (1  
)(uL   cL), (cH   cL) > uL   cL and (1   qH)q^ > q^   qH), then the following
properties uniquely determine a DE:
(3.1) Low and negligible prices are o¤ered at date 1, i.e., L1 > 0 and 1 H1  L1 > 0.
(3.2) High, low and negligible prices are o¤ered at every intermediate date, i.e., Ht >
0; Lt > 0; and 1  Ht   Lt > 0 for t 2 f2; : : : ; T   1g:
(3.3) High and low prices are o¤ered at date T , i.e., HT > 0 and 
L
T > 0.
In this equilibrium the payo¤ to low quality sellers is
V L1 =
 
1  T 1(1  q^) (uL   cL);
the payo¤ to buyers is
V B1 = 
T 1(1  q^)(uL   cL);
and the surplus is
SDE =

mL +mHT 1(1  q^) (uL   cL):
Thus, the payo¤ to buyers (low quality sellers) is above (below) their competitive
payo¤, and decreases (increases) with T and increases (decreases) with  and . Also,
the surplus is above the competitive surplus S, and decreases with T and increases
with  and .
Proposition 4 establishes that conditions slightly stronger than those of Proposi-
tion 3, properties (3.1)-(3.3) of Proposition 3 are satised in every DE, and there-
fore the market has a unique DE. The requirement T 1(cH   cL) > uL   cL
holds for  and  su¢ ciently close to one since cH > uL > cL. The requirement


(1  qH)q^   q^ + qH (cH cL) > qH(1 q^)(uL cL) reduces to (cH cL) > uL cL
for  = 1; which holds for  close to one.
Proposition 4. If T < 1 and frictions are su¢ ciently small (i.e., (cH   uL) >
(1  )(uL  cL); T 1(cH   cL) > uL  cL and  (1  qH)q^   q^ + qH (cH   cL) >
qH(1  q^)(uL   cL)), then there is a unique DE.
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We now discuss the properties of the DE. It is easy to describe the trading patterns:
at the rst date some matched low quality sellers trade, but no high quality sellers
trade. At intermediate dates, some matched sellers of both types trade. At the last
date all matched low quality sellers and some matched high quality sellers trade. At
every date but the rst there is trade at more than one price, since both cH and
rLt < c
H are o¤ered.
Price dispersion is key feature of equilibrium: Suppose instead that all buyers
o¤er the high price rHt = c
H at some date t, i.e., Ht = 1. Then for  and  near
one the reservation price of low quality sellers will be near cH , and hence above uL,
prior to t. Thus, a low price o¤er (which if accepted buys a unit of low quality, whose
value is only uL) is suboptimal prior to t. Hence only high and negligible o¤ers are
made prior to t, and thus qHt = q
H ; but then a high price o¤er is suboptimal at t
since qHt < q. Hence 
H
t < 1. Likewise, suppose that all buyers o¤er the low price
rLt at some date t < T , i.e., 
L
t = 1. Then all matched low quality sellers trade, and
hence  near one implies qHt+1 > q^, and therefore q
H
T > q^. But q
H
T > q^ implies that
rHT = c
H is the only optimal price o¤er at date T , which contradicts that HT < 1.
Hence Lt < 1.
A more involved argument establishes that all three types of price o¤ers high,
low, and negligible are made at every date except the rst and last (i.e., Ht > 0,
Lt > 0, and 1  Ht   Lt > 0 for t 2 f2; : : : ; T   1g). Identifying the probabilities of
the di¤erent price o¤ers is delicate: Their past values determine the current market
composition, and their future values determine the sellersreservation prices. In equi-
librium, at each intermediate date the market composition and the sellersreservation
prices make buyers indi¤erent between a high, a low or a negligible price o¤er. Closed
form expressions for these probabilities are derived in the proof of Proposition 3.
The comparative statics of buyer payo¤s are intuitive: In equilibrium negligible
price o¤ers are optimal at every date except the last. Hence only at the last date does
a buyer capture any gains to trade. Consequently, buyer payo¤s are increasing in .
Also, decreasing T or increasing  reduces delay costs and therefore increases buyer
payo¤s. Low quality sellers capture surplus whenever high price o¤ers are made, i.e.,
at every date except the rst. The probability of a high price o¤er decreases with
both  and  (see equation 10 in the proof of Proposition 3), and thus the payo¤ to
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low quality sellers also decreases.
In the DE, units of both qualities trade, although with delay. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the surplus generated in the DE is greater than the (static) competitive
equilibrium surplus, S. Thus the gains realized from trading high quality units more
than o¤sets the loss from trading low quality units with delay.
Counter-intuitively, shortening the horizon over which the market opens is ad-
vantageous since the surplus decreases with T (for T  2); i.e., it is maximal when
T = 2. In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that at the last date the fraction of
high quality sellers and the probability of a high price are both independent of T .
Thus, shortening the horizon decreases delay costs without signicantly reducing the
measures of high and low quality units that trade.
Proposition 5 identies the probabilities of high, low, and negligible price o¤ers
as frictions vanish. A remarkable feature of equilibrium is that at every intermediate
date all price o¤ers are negligible; that is, all trade concentrates at the rst and last
date. Thus, the market freezes, i.e., both qualities become completely illiquid. And
since the market is active for only two dates (the rst and the last), not surprisingly
the equilibrium is independent of T so long as 1 < T <1.
Proposition 5. If 1 < T <1, then as  and  approach one the DE described in
Proposition 3 is eventually the unique equilibrium, and the sequences of probabilities
of high and low price o¤ers approach (~H ; ~L) given by
(5.1) ~H1 = 0 and 0 < ~
L
1 =
q^   qH
q^ (1  qH) < 1.
(5.2) ~Lt = ~
H
t = 0 for 1 < t < T .
(5.3) 0 < ~HT =
uL   cL
uH   cL < 1 and ~
L
T = 1  ~HT .
Thus, trade concentrates at the rst and the last dates. Moreover, the payo¤ to buyers
remains above their competitive payo¤ and approaches ~V B1 = (1  q^) (uL   cL), the
payo¤ to low quality sellers remains below their competitive payo¤ and approaches
~V L1 = q^(u
L   cL), and the surplus remains above the competitive surplus and ap-
proaches
~S =

mL +mH (1  q^) (uL   cL);
independently of T .
14
Decentralized Market Equilibria when T =1
We now consider decentralized markets that open for innitely many dates. In
these markets, given a strategy distribution (; rH ; rL) one calculates the maximum
expected utility of each type of trader at each date by solving a dynamic optimization
problem. The denition of decentralized market equilibrium, however, remains the
same.
Proposition 6 identies a DE when frictions are small. This equilibrium is the
limit, as T approaches innity, of the equilibrium described in Proposition 3. More
precisely, for every integer T; denote by (H(T ); L(T ); rH(T ); rL(T )) the DE iden-
tied in Proposition 3 for a market that opens for T dates. For each t and  ; let
^t and r^

t be the limits limT!1 

t (T ) and limT!1 r

t (T ): These limits are well de-
ned. Proposition 6 shows that (^H ; ^L; r^H ; r^L) is a DE of a market that opens
over an innite horizon. Although there are multiple equilibria when T = 1, this
limiting equilibrium is a natural selection since for every nite T the DE identied
in Proposition 3 is the unique equilibrium for  and  close to one. The assump-
tion in Proposition 6 that frictions are small holds for  and  close to one since
cH   cL > uL   cL and q < 1.
Proposition 6. If T =1 and frictions are small (i.e., (cH uL) > (1  ) (uL 
cL) and (1  qH)q > q   qH), then (^H ; ^L; r^H ; r^L), the limit of the sequence of the
DE identied in Proposition 3, given by
(6.1) r^Ht = c
H , r^Lt = u
L for all t,
(6.2) ^H1 = 0; ^
L
1 =
q   qH
q (1  qH) , and
(6.3) ^Lt = 0; ^
H
t =
1  

uL   cL
cH   uL for t > 1,
is a DE. In this equilibrium, the traderspayo¤s are V B1 = V
H
1 = 0 and V
L
1 = u
L cL,
and the surplus is the competitive surplus, i.e., SDE = S, independently of the values
of  and .
In the equilibrium of Proposition 6 all units trade eventually. At the rst date,
some low quality units trade but no high quality units trade. At subsequent dates,
units of both qualities trade with the same constant probability. The traderspayo¤s
are competitive independently of  and , and hence so is the surplus, even if frictions
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are non-negligible (provided they are small). This result is in contrast to most of the
literature (e.g., Gale (1986), Moreno and Wooders (2010)), which shows that payo¤s
are competitive only as frictions vanish.3
An Example
Table 1 illustrates our results for a market in which uH = 1, cH = :6, uL = :4,
cL = :2, mH = :2, and mL = :8. The left hand side of the table shows the equilibrium
values of Ht and 
L
t for a market open for 10 dates. The bottom rows give the traders
payo¤s and the surplus. For the values of  and  given in the table, the DE is unique.
T = 10 T =1
 =  = :95  =  = :99  =  = :95  =  = :99
t Ht 
L
t 
H
t 
L
t 
H
t 
L
t 
H
t 
L
t
1 .0000 .7155 .0000 .7426 .0000 .5263 .0000 .5051
2 .0421 .0224 .0070 .0062 .0554 .0000 .0102 .0000
3 .0416 .0235 .0070 .0062 .0554 .0000 .0102 .0000
4 .0411 .0247 .0070 .0063
...
...
...
...
5 .0405 .0259 .0069 .0063
...
...
...
...
6 .0399 .0273 .0069 .0064
...
...
...
...
7 .0394 .0286 .0069 .0065
...
...
...
...
8 .0388 .0301 .0069 .0065
...
...
...
...
9 .0382 .0639 .0068 .0132
...
...
...
...
10 .3040 .6960 .2602 .7398
...
...
...
...
V L .1401 .1096 .2000 .2000
V B .0599 .0904 .0000 .0000
SDE .1720 .1781 .1600 .1600
Table 1: Decentralized Market Equilibria
Comparing the results for  =  = :95 to  =  = :99, we see that the probabilities
of high and low price o¤ers decline when frictions are smaller: when  = a = :99
more than 98% of all o¤ers are negligible prices. As frictions vanish, at intermediate
3Kim (2011) also nds that surplus is competitive even if frictions are non-negligible.
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dates all price o¤ers are negligible, i.e., the market freezes see Proposition 5.2. The
surplus realized exceeds the static competitive surplus (of mL(uL   cL) = :16 ), and
it does so even in the limit as frictions vanish.
Figure 2a and 2b show the dynamics of the stocks of sellers of high and low
quality in the market, mHt and m
L
t . Figure 2c shows that dynamics of the fraction
of high quality sellers in the market, qHt . These gures illustrate several features of
equilibrium as frictions become small: (i) high quality trades more slowly, (ii) low
quality trades more quickly at the rst date and at the last date, but trades more
slowly at intermediate dates, (iii) the fraction of sellers of high quality in the market
increases more quickly, but equals .5 at the market close regardless of the level of
frictions. Even when frictions are very small (e.g.,  =  = :99) a substantial fraction
of high quality sellers does not trade.
Figure 2 goes here.
The right hand side of Table 1 shows the equilibrium values of Ht and 
L
t in the
DE described in Proposition 6 for a market that opens over an innite horizon. In
contrast to the example with T = 10, the DE yields exactly the competitive surplus
even though frictions are non-negligible. After the rst date, high and negligible
price o¤ers are made with constant probabilities. The probability that a unit of
either quality trades is thus positive and constant over time, and hence all units trade
eventually. As  approaches one, the probability of a high price o¤er approaches zero,
and the market becomes illiquid. The expected delay approaches innity, although
it does so at a speed that holds the surplus xed at the competitive level.
Market Liquidity
Assets that are easily bought or sold are known as liquid assets. We identify the
liquidity of a unit of quality  at date t with the equilibrium probability that the
unit trades at t, denoted by lt . Thus, the liquidity of a high quality unit at date t is
lHt = 
H
t , and the liquidity of a low quality unit is l
L
t = (
H
t + 
L
t ).
4 Proposition 7
4The di¤erence between the bid and the ask price is a common measure of liquidity in centralized
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shows how the liquidity of each quality changes in response to changes in the value of
low quality units, the discount factor, and the matching probability. Its proof relies
on the expressions for Ht and 
L
t given in the proofs of propositions 3 and 6.
Proposition 7. In a decentralized market:
(7.1) If 1 < T < 1 and the assumptions of Proposition 3 hold, then for t 2
f2; : : : ; Tg:
(i) The liquidity of high quality decreases as the traders become more patient, i.e.,
@lH1 =@ = 0 and @l
H
t =@ < 0.
(ii) The liquidity of high quality decreases as the matching probability increases,
i.e., @lH1 =@ = 0 and @l
H
t =@ < 0.
(iii) Increasing the value of low quality increases the liquidity of high quality at all
dates but the rst, i.e., @lH1 =@u
L = 0 and @lHt =@u
L > 0.
(7.2) If T =1 and the assumptions of Proposition 6 hold, then for t 2 f2; : : : ; Tg:
(i) The liquidity of both qualities decreases as traders become more patient, i.e.,
@lH1 =@ = @l
L
1 =@ = 0 and @l
H
t =@ = @l
L
t =@ < 0.
(ii) The liquidity of both qualities is unchanged as the matching probability in-
creases, i.e., @lH1 =@ = @l
L
1 =@ = @l
H
t =@ = @l
L
t =@ = 0.
(iii) Increasing the value of low quality decreases the liquidity of low quality in the
rst date, but increases the liquidity of both qualities at every subsequent date, i.e.,
@lH1 =@u
L = 0 and @lL1 =@u
L < 0; and @lHt =@u
L = @lLt =@u
L > 0.
When the horizon is nite, high quality is less liquid as traders become more
patient and, perhaps counter-intuitively, as the probability of meeting a partner in-
creases. Indeed, both qualities become completely illiquid at intermediate dates as
both  and  approach 1 see Proposition 5. An increase in the value of low quality
increases the liquidity of high quality, but it decreases the liquidity of low quality at
date 1.5
markets. In our model trade is decentralized and takes place at di¤erent prices. Therefore we focus
on the ease with which an asset is sold.
5One can show that @lL1 =@u
L < 0, but the sign of @lLt =@u
L at intermediate dates is unclear.
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For the market in Example 1, Table 2 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase of the
value of uL from .4 to .45. The liquidity of low quality decreases at the rst date, but
increases thereafter. The liquidity of high quality increases at all dates t > 1.
T = 10 T =1
uL = :4 uL = :45 uL = :4 uL = :45
t lHt l
L
t l
H
t l
L
t l
H
t l
L
t l
H
t l
L
t
1 .0000 .6797 .0000 0.64899 .0000 .5000 .0000 .3333
2 .0400 .0613 .0575 0.08624 .0526 .0526 .0877 .0877
3 .0395 .0619 .0565 0.08659 .0526 .0526 .0877 .0877
4 .0390 .0625 .0555 0.08700
...
...
...
...
5 .0385 .0631 .0544 0.08748
...
...
...
...
6 .0379 .0638 .0533 0.08804
...
...
...
...
7 .0374 .0646 .0523 0.08868
...
...
...
...
8 .0368 .0654 .0512 0.08941
...
...
...
...
9 .0363 .0969 .0501 0.13069
...
...
...
...
10 .2888 .9500 .3610 0.95000
...
...
...
...
Table 2: The E¤ect on Liquidity of an Increase in uL ( =  = :95)
When the horizon is innite, the liquidity of both qualities decreases with .
Liquidity is independent of : an increase in  is exactly o¤set by a decrease in
the probability of a high price o¤er (recall that only high and negligible price o¤ers
are made with positive probability see Proposition 6). An increase in uL reduces
the liquidity of low quality units at the rst date but increases the liquidity of both
qualities at every subsequent date.
An overall e¤ect of a parameter change is its impact on the expected date at which
a unit trades. For the example in Table 2, an increase in uL increases the probability
that a unit of either quality trades at dates t  2 from :0526 to :0877. The expected
date at which a high quality unit trades decreases from 1 + 1=:0526 = 20:01 to
1 + 1=:0877 = 12:40. While the increase in uL nearly doubles the speed at which
high quality trades, it has only a small e¤ect on low quality since the probability that
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low quality trades at date 1 falls: the expected date at which low quality trades is
reduced from 10:51 to 8:60.
Policy Intervention
Our results characterizing the equilibrium of a decentralized market allow an as-
sessment of the impact of programs aimed at improving market e¢ ciency.6 We study
the impact of taxes and subsidies. Suppose, for example, that the government pro-
vides a per unit subsidy of  > 0 to buyers of low quality. (A tax is a negative
subsidy.) Such a subsidy is feasible provided that quality is veriable following pur-
chase. Hence the instantaneous payo¤ to a buyer who purchases a unit of quality 
at price p is u +   p rather than u   p. The impact of a subsidy may therefore be
evaluated as an increase of the value of uL. In this section we focus on the impact of
subsidies on surplus, but their impact on liquidity can be assessed using our results
in the prior section.
For a market that opens over a nite horizon, Proposition 3 provides analytic
expressions for the traderspayo¤s, as well as the surplus. We use these expressions
to evaluate the impact of subsidies and taxes.
A subsidy  on low quality has no impact on the payo¤ of high quality sellers,
increases the payo¤ of low quality sellers by [1  T 1(1  q^)], increases the payo¤
of buyers by T 1(1   q^); and increases the surplus by [mL +mHT 1(1   q^)].
The present value cost of the subsidy is bounded above by mL since at most mL
units receive the subsidy. Thus, the increase in surplus is larger than the cost of the
subsidy. Hence the net surplus, i.e., the surplus minus the present value cost of the
subsidy, increases. We summarize these results in Remark 3.
Remark 3. In a decentralized market open over a nite horizon, a subsidy on low
quality increases the payo¤ of low quality sellers and buyers, as well as the net surplus.
A tax has the opposite e¤ects.
A subsidy H on high quality a¤ects payo¤s and surplus through its impact on q^.
It is easy to see that such a subsidy decreases the payo¤of low quality sellers, increases
the payo¤ of buyers, but its impact on the surplus is ambiguous. Nevertheless, the
6An example of such a program is the Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets, by
which the U.S. government provided nancial assistance to investors who purchased legacy assets.
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subsidy unambiguously lowers the net surplus as  and  approach one: The (gross)
surplus with the subsidy approaches ~S =

mL +mH (1  q^) (uL   cL), where q^ =
(cH   cL)=(uH +H   cL). Since high quality trades only at the last date, the cost of
the subsidy approaches mHH~HT , where ~
H
T = (u
L   cL)=(uH + H   cL). Thus the
net surplus approaches
mL +mH

1  c
H   cL
uH + H   cL

(uL   cL) mHH u
L   cL
uH + H   cL ;
which reduces to
mL(uL   cL) +mH  uH   cH uL   cL
uH + H   cL ;
which is decreasing in H . Remark 4 summarizes the impact of a subsidy on high
quality.
Remark 4. In a decentralized market that opens over a nite horizon, a subsidy
on high quality decreases the payo¤ of low quality sellers and increases the payo¤
of buyers, and may decrease the net surplus. Moreover, as  and  approach one
a subsidy on high quality unambiguously decreases the net surplus. A tax has the
opposite e¤ects.
Table 3 illustrates the e¤ect of several subsidies and taxes for the market of Ex-
ample 1 when  =  = :95 and T = 10.
Subsidy/Tax Measures Trading Surplus PV
L H High Low Buyers Low Total Net Cost
0 0 .0958 .7927 .0599 .1121 .1720 .1720 0
:05 0 .1179 .7936 .0748 .1401 .2150 .1790 .0360
:00 :05 .0932 .7917 .0634 .1093 .1727 .1693 .0034
0  :05 .0988 .7936 .0559 .1153 .1712 .1748  :0036
:05 05 .1148 .7927 .0792 .1366 .2159 .1761 .0398
Table 3: E¤ects of Subsidies and Taxes
The second row of Table 3 describes the e¤ect of a subsidy L = :05 on low
quality. Relative to the equilibrium without any subsidy or tax (described in the rst
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row), the measure of high quality sellers that trades increases from :0958 to :1179
(i.e., from 47:92% to 58:96% of all high quality sellers). The measure of low quality
sellers that trades increases modestly from :7927 to :7936. The surplus increases to
:2150. The present value cost of the subsidy is :0360. Thus, the net surplus increases
to :2150  :0360 = :1790.
A subsidy H = :05 on high quality has a negative e¤ect on the net surplus: The
subsidy increases surplus to :1727. The present value cost of the subsidy is :0034, and
therefore the net surplus decreases to :1693. This decrease is the result of a decrease
in the measures of trade of both qualities. Naturally, a tax has the opposite e¤ect,
as the fourth row of Table 3 shows.
If quality is not veriable after purchase, a subsidy conditional on quality is not
feasible. As shown in the last row of Table 3, an unconditional subsidy increases
surplus to :2159. The subsidy H = L = :05 is more costly and has a smaller
positive e¤ect on the net surplus than a subsidy on low quality alone.
Proposition 6 provides analytic expressions for the traderspayo¤s and the surplus
in a market that opens over an innite horizon. A subsidy of L > 0 on low quality
increases the payo¤ of low quality sellers by L, and increases the surplus by LmL.
Since not all low quality trades at date 1, the present value cost of the subsidy is less
than LmL, and therefore the net surplus increases. We show that as  approaches
one, the present value cost of the subsidy approaches LmL (see the appendix), and
thus the subsidy amounts to a transfer to low quality sellers. We summarize these
results in Remark 5.
Remark 5. In a decentralized market that opens over an innite horizon, a subsidy
on low quality increases the payo¤ of low quality sellers as well as the net surplus.
As  approaches one the subsidy amounts to a transfer to low quality sellers.
A subsidy on high quality has no e¤ect on either the traderspayo¤or the surplus;
its only e¤ect is to decrease the probability of a low price o¤er at date 1, and thereby
to increase the delay with which low quality trades. Interestingly, a tax on high
quality raises revenue without a¤ecting either the traderspayo¤s or the surplus: A
tax on high quality raises surplus by increasing the volume of trade of low quality
units at date 1, while having no e¤ect on trade in subsequent dates. (Specically, the
tax reduces q and increases ^L1 ; while leaving ^
L
t and ^
H
t unchanged see Proposition
22
6.) While the traderspayo¤s and the surplus remains unchanged, the net surplus
(which includes tax revenue) increases. We summarize these results in Remark 6.
Remark 6. In a decentralized market that opens over an innite horizon, a subsidy
on high quality has no e¤ect on either the traders payo¤s or the surplus, and is
therefore purely wasteful. Strikingly, a tax on high quality raises revenue without
a¤ecting payo¤s or surplus.
4 A Dynamic Competitive Market for Lemons
In this section we study the market described in Section 2 when trade is centralized.
The market opens for T consecutive dates, and the tradersdiscount rate is  2 (0; 1).
The supply and demand schedules are dened as follows. Let p = (p1;. . . ; pT ) 2
RT+ be a sequence of prices. The utility to a seller of quality  2 fH;Lg who supplies
at date t is t 1(pt   c ). Hence the maximum utility that a  -quality seller may
attain is
v (p) = max
t2f1;:::;Tg
f0; t 1(pt   c )g:
The supply of  -quality good, denoted S (p); is the set of sequences s = (s1;. . . ; s

T ) 2
RT+ satisfying:
(S:1)
XT
t=1
st  m ,
(S:2) st > 0 implies 
t 1(pt   c ) = v (p), and
(S:3)
XT
t=1
st  m

v (p) = 0.
Condition S:1 requires that no more of good  than is available, m , be supplied.
Condition S:2 requires that supply be positive only at dates where it is optimal to
supply. Condition S:3 requires that the total amount of good  available be supplied
when  -quality sellers may attain a positive utility (i.e., when v (p) > 0).
Denote by ut 2 [uL; uH ] the expected value to buyers of a unit supplied at date t.
Then the utility to a buyer who demands a unit of the good at date t is t 1(ut  pt).
If the sequence of buyers expected values is u = (u1;. . . ; uT ); then the maximum
utility a buyer may attain is
vB(p; u) = max
t2f1;:::;Tg
f0; t 1(ut   pt)g:
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The market demand, D(p; u), is the set of sequences d = (d1;. . . ; dT ) 2 RT+ satisfying:
(D:1)
XT
t=1
dt  mB,
(D:2) dt > 0 implies 
t 1(ut   pt) = vB(p; u), and
(D:3)
XT
t=1
dt  mB

vB(p; u) = 0.
Condition D:1 requires that the total demand not exceed the measure of buyers.
Condition D:2 requires that the demand be positive only at dates where buying is
optimal. ConditionD:3 requires that demand be equal to the measure of buyers when
buyers may attain a positive utility (i.e., when vB(p; u) > 0).
We dene dynamic competitive equilibrium along the lines in the literature see
e.g., Wooders (1998), and Janssen and Roy (2002).
A dynamic competitive equilibrium (CE) is a prole (p; u; sH ; sL; d) such that sH 2
SH(p); sL 2 SL(p), d 2 D(p; u); and for each t:
(CE:1) sHt + s
L
t = dt; and
(CE:2) sHt + s
L
t = dt > 0 implies ut =
uHsHt + u
LsLt
sHt + s
L
t
.
Condition CE:1 requires that the market clear at each date, and condition CE:2
requires that the expectations described by the vector u be correct whenever there is
trade. For a market that opens for a single date (i.e., if T = 1), our denition reduces
to Akerlofs. The surplus generated in a CE may be calculated as
SCE =
X
2fH;Lg
TX
t=1
st 
t 1(u   c ): (3)
As our next proposition shows, there is a CE where all low quality units trade at
date 1 at the price uL, and none of the high quality units ever trade. Moreover, if the
market is open over a su¢ ciently short horizon, then every CE has these properties.
Specically, the horizon T must be less than T , which is dened by the inequality
T 2(cH   cL) > uL   cL  T 1(cH   cL):
Since T approaches innity as  approaches one, for a given T the condition T < T
holds when  is near one, i.e., when traders are su¢ ciently patient.
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Proposition 8. There are CE in which all low quality units trade immediately at
the price uL and none of the high quality units trade, e.g., (p; u; sH ; sL; d) given by
pt = ut = u
L for all t, sL1 = d1 = m
L, and sH1 = s
H
t = s
L
t = dt = 0 for t > 1 is a
CE. In these CE the payo¤ to low quality sellers is uL  cL, the payo¤ to high quality
sellers and buyers is zero, and the surplus is S: Moreover, if T < T , then every CE
has these properties.
The intuition for why high quality does not trade when T < T is clear: If high
quality were to trade at t  T , then pt must be at least cH . Hence the utility to low
quality sellers is at least t 1(cH   cL). Since
t 1(cH   cL)  T 1(cH   cL)  T 2(cH   cL) > uL   cL > 0;
then all low quality sellers trade at prices greater than uL. But at a price p 2 (uL; cH)
only low quality sellers supply, and therefore the demand is zero. Hence all trade is
at prices of at least cH . Since u(qH) < cH by assumption, and since in equilibrium all
low quality is supplied, there must be a date at which there is trade and the expected
value of a random unit supplied is below cH . This contradicts that there is demand
at such a date. Thus, high quality is not supplied in a CE. Consequently, low quality
sellers capture the entire surplus, i.e., the price is uL, as low quality sellers are the
short side of the market.7
Recall from propositions 3 and 4 that when frictions are small the surplus realized
in a decentralized market is greater than the static competitive surplus, i.e., SDE > S:
By Proposition 8, a dynamic competitive market that opens over a nite horizon
generates the static competitive surplus, i.e., SCE = S. Thus, decentralized markets
perform better than centralized markets when the horizon is short or, equivalently,
the traders are su¢ ciently patient.
Proposition 9 below establishes that in a centralized market that opens over a
su¢ ciently long horizon there are dynamic competitive separating equilibria in which
all low quality units trade immediately and all high quality units trade with delay.
7Janssen and Roy (2002) focus on CE in which the expected value to buyers of a random unit at
dates when there is no trade is at least the value of the lowest quality for which there is a positive
measure of unsold units. Under the assumption of Proposition 8, no CE with this property exists.
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Specically, the horizon T must be at least eT , which is dened by the inequality

eT 2(uH   cL) > uL   cL   eT 1(uH   cL):
Since uH > cH , then eT  T .
Proposition 9. If T  eT , then there are CE in which all low quality units trade at
date 1 and all high quality units trade at date eT . Such CE yield a surplus of
SCE = mL(uL   cL) +mH eT 1(uH   cH) > S:
By Proposition 9, a centralized market that opens over a su¢ ciently long horizon
eventually recovers from adverse selection. Such markets have equilibria in which
high quality trades that yield more surplus than the static competitive surplus. Con-
sequently, when the horizon is innite, centralized markets outperform decentralized
markets (which by Proposition 6 yield the static competitive surplus).8
In the separating CE of Proposition 9, high quality trades with increasingly long
delay as  approaches one, i.e., eT increases with . We show (see the proof of Propo-
sition 10) that
lim
!1

eT () 1 = uL   cL
uH   cL ;
and therefore that the surplus realized from trading high quality approaches
mH
uL   cL
uH   cL (u
H   cH) = mH (1  q^) (uL   cL):
Thus, as  approaches one the surplus in these separating CE approaches ~S, the
surplus realized in a decentralized market open over a nite horizon as  approaches
one. This result is established in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10. If T = 1, then the surplus realized in a CE in which all low
quality units trade at date 1 and all high quality units trade at eT approaches ~S as 
approaches one, i.e.,
lim
!1
SCE = ~S:
8When T  T < eT there are no separating CE, but there are partially pooling CE in which high
quality trades. The most e¢ cient of these CE, in which some low quality trades at date 1 while the
remaining low quality and all the high quality trade at date T , yields a surplus greater than S.
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Proposition 10 reveals that the same incentive constraints are at play in both
centralized and decentralized markets: In a separating CE high quality trades with a
su¢ ciently long delay that low quality sellers prefer trading immediately at a low price
to waiting and trading at a high price. Likewise, in a decentralized market equilibrium
high price o¤ers are made with su¢ ciently low probability that low quality sellers
accept a low price o¤er.
In summary, a centralized market that opens over a nite horizon does not perform
well when  is close to one: in every CE only low quality trades and the surplus equals
the static competitive surplus. Likewise, decentralized markets that open over an
innite horizon do not perform well since they generate only the static competitive
surplus.
Market Liquidity
We discuss the liquidity of high quality in centralized markets for lemons, and
illustrate our conclusions for the market in which uH = 1, cH = :6, uL = :4, cL = :2,
mH = :2, and mL = :8, whose decentralized market equilibrium is described in Table
1. We assume that  = :95 and, when the market is decentralized, that  = :95. In
this market T = 15 and eT = 29.
Assume that T is nite. Then for  su¢ ciently large, we have T < T , and by
Proposition 8 in a centralized market high quality units do not trade. In contrast,
in a decentralized market high quality units trade. Thus, high quality is more liquid
when the market is decentralized. Consider the market for lemons described above,
and assume that T = 10. When the market is centralized, since T < T , then no high
quality units trade. In contrast, using the results in Table 1, one can show that a
measure :09583 of high quality units trade (48% of the total measure of high quality
units in the market) when the market is decentralized.
When T is innite, in a centralized market there are CE in which all high quality
units trade (by Proposition 9), although the earliest date at which high quality trades
in any separating CE is eT . In a decentralized market all units eventually trade. The
expected date at which a high quality unit trades is
1X
t=1
t^Ht
t 1Y
k=1
 
1  ^Hk

= 1 +

1  

uL   cL
cH   uL
 1
;
where ^H is given in Proposition 6. In our example, the expected date at which high
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quality trades is 20, while it trades at date eT = 29 in the separating CE. In this
sense high quality is more liquid when the market is decentralized than when it is
centralized.
In contrast, whether the market opens over a nite or an innite horizon, in a
separating CE low quality trades immediately, but trades with delay in a DE. In our
example, a measure :79268 of low quality sellers trade (99% of a total measure of .8)
in the DE. The expected date at which a low quality unit trades is
1X
t=1
t^Lt
t 1Y
k=1
 
1  ^Lk

= 1 +

1  q   q
H
q (1  qH)

1  

uL   cL
cH   uL
 1
;
 immediately in the separating CE. Hence low quality is less liquid in a decentralized
market.
Policy Intervention
As noted earlier, a subsidy or tax on low (high) quality changes the value of
uL (uH). In a centralized market marginal changes in the parameter values do not
a¤ect the value of T or eT generically, and therefore have no e¤ect on the net surplus.
Moreover, any subsidy that changes the value of T but leaves it above T has no e¤ect
on the net surplus since by Proposition 8 only low quality trades. In particular, a
subsidy on high quality increases the value of T , and therefore has not e¤ect when
T < T .
When T  eT , a subsidy on low quality or a tax on high quality that reduces the
value of eT increases the net surplus realized in the separating CE of Proposition 9
as high quality trades sooner. Thus, subsidies or taxes (large enough to a¤ect eT )
tend to have analogous e¤ects in centralized markets as in decentralized ones recall
that a subsidy on low quality or a tax on high quality raises net surplus in a DE (see
remarks 3-6).
As  approaches one, then T approaches innity, and therefore in a centralized
market open over a nite horizon T only low quality trades (because T eventually
exceeds T ), and hence a subsidy or a tax has no e¤ect. In a decentralized market,
however, a subsidy on low quality or a tax on high quality raises the net surplus as
 and  approach one (see remarks 3 and 4).
In a centralized market open over an innite horizon, however, the e¤ect on the
net surplus realized in the separating CE of Proposition 9 of a subsidy on the 
28
quality good is given by the derivative of ~S with respect to u . Thus, a subsidy
on low quality or a tax on high quality increases the net surplus. (Recall that in a
decentralized market open over an innite horizon a subsidy to low quality or a tax
on high quality also increase the net surplus see remarks 5 and 6.)
5 Conclusion
In the equilibrium of a decentralized market with adverse selection the good trades
slowly: At the rst date only low quality trades; at intermediates dates both qualities
trade, although with low probability; at the last date matched low quality trades for
sure and high quality trades with positive probability. Negligible prices o¤ers, which
are rejected, are made with positive probability at every date except the last, and
high price o¤ers are made with small probability at all intermediate dates. This keeps
the reservation price of low quality sellers su¢ ciently low that they accept low prices
at every date. As frictions vanish, the market freezes at intermediate dates and there
is only trade at the rst and the last dates.
The surplus realized is above the competitive surplus, and decreases as the hori-
zon grows larger, approaching the static competitive surplus as the horizon becomes
innite even if frictions are non-negligible. Nonetheless, for a xed nite horizon high
quality remains liquid and the surplus remains above the competitive surplus even as
frictions vanish. Subsidies on low quality or taxes on high quality raise surplus.
In the dynamic competitive equilibrium of a centralized market in which traders
are patient and the horizon is nite, only low quality trades. When the horizon is
innite, however, there are dynamic competitive equilibria in which both qualities
trade and the surplus is above the static competitive surplus. Small subsides or taxes
have no e¤ect, and discrete ones tend to have similar e¤ects as in a decentralized
market.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
We begin by establishing a number of lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume that 1 < T < 1, and let (; rH ; rL) be a DE. Then for each
t 2 f1;. . . ; Tg:
(L1:1) t(maxfrHt ; rLt g) = 1:
(L1:2) mt > 0 and q

t > 0 for  2 fH;Lg:
(L1:3) rHt = c
H > rLt ; V
H
t = 0 < V
B
t , and V
L
t  cH   cL:
(L1:4) qHt+1  qHt :
(L1:5) t(c
H) = 1:
(L1:6) t(p) = t(r
L
t ) for all p 2 [rLt ; cH):
(L1:7) LT = 1:
(L1:8) If Lt = 
H
t ; then q

t+1 = q

t+1 for  2 fH;Lg:
Proof: Let t 2 f1;. . . ; Tg. We prove L1:1:Write p = maxfrHt ; rLt g, and suppose that
t(p) < 1. Then there is p^ > p in the support of t: Since I(p; rt ) = I(p^; r

t ) = 1 for
 2 fH;Lg, we have
V Bt  
X
2fH;Lg
qt I(p; r

t )(u
   p) +
241   X
2fH;Lg
qt I(p; r

t )
35 V Bt+1
= 
X
2fH;Lg
qt (u
   p) + (1  ) V Bt+1
> 
X
2fH;Lg
qt (u
   p^) + (1  ) V Bt+1
= 
X
2fH;Lg
qt I(p^; r

t )(u
   p^) +
241   X
2fH;Lg
qt I(p^; r

t )
35 V Bt+1;
which contradicts DE:B.
Clearly mt > 0 implies q

t > 0: We prove by induction that m

t > 0 for all t and
 . Let  2 fH;Lg; we have m1 = m > 0: Assume that mk > 0 for some k  1; then
 2 (0; 1) and k 2 [0; 1] imply mk+1 = (1  k)mk > 0.
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We prove L1:3 by induction. Because V T+1 = 0 for  2 fB;H;Lg; then DE:H
and DE:L imply
rHT = c
H + V HT+1 = c
H > cL = rLT = c
L + V LT+1:
Hence T (cH) = 1 by L1:1, and therefore V HT = 0 and V
L
T  cH   cL: Moreover,
0 < qLT
 
uL   cL  V BT : Let k  T , and assume that L1:3 holds for t 2 fk; :::; Tg; we
show that it holds for k 1: Since V Hk = 0; DE:H implies rHk 1 = cH+V Hk = cH : Since
V Lk  cH cL and  < 1; then DE:L implies rLk 1 = cL+V Lk  (1 )cL+cH < cH :
Hence k(cH) = 1 by L1:1, and therefore V Hk 1 = 0. Also since t(c
H) = 1 for t  k 1;
then V Lk 1  cH   cL. Also V Bk 1  V Bk > 0:
In order to prove L1:4; note that L1:3 implies Ht  Lt . Hence
qHt+1 =
mHt+1
mHt+1 +m
L
t+1
=
(1  Ht )mHt
(1  Ht )mHt + (1  Lt )mLt
 m
H
t
mHt +m
L
t
= qHt :
As for L1:5; it is a direct implication of L1:1 and L1:3:
We prove L1:6: Suppose that t(p) > t(rLt ) for some p 2 (rLt ; rHt ): Then there is
p^ in the support of t such that rLt < p^ < r
H
t : Since I(p^; r
L
t ) = 1 and I(p^; r
H
t ) = 0;
then
V Bt  
X
2fH;Lg
qt I(r
L
t ; r

t )(u
   rLt ) +
241   X
2fH;Lg
qt I(r
L
t ; r

t )
35 V Bt+1
= qLt (u
L   rLt ) + (1  qLt )V Bt+1
> qLt (u
L   p^) + (1  qLt )V Bt+1
= 
X
2fH;Lg
qt I(p^; r

t )(u
   p^) +
241   X
2fH;Lg
qt I(p^; r

t )
35 V Bt+1;
which contradicts DE:B.
We prove LT = 1: Suppose by way of contradiction that 
L
T < 1: Then there is a
p^ < cL in the support of T : Since I(p^; rHt ) = 0 and V
B
T+1 = 0; then the payo¤ to a
buyer o¤ering p^ is zero. Since p^ is the support of T ; then DE:B implies V BT = 0;
which contradicts L1:3.
In order to prove L1:8; simply note that Lt = 
H
t implies
qt+1 =
mHt+1
mHt+1 +m
L
t+1
=
(1  t )mt 
1  Ht

qHt +
 
1  Lt

qLt
=
mt
mHt +m
L
t
= qt . 
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Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition (1.1) follows from lemmas L1:3 and L1:4, and
Proposition (1.2) follows from L1:5 and L1:6. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Since HT + 
L
T = 
L
T ; then (2:3) follows from L1:7:
We prove (2:1): Suppose contrary to (2.1) that there is k such that Hk +
L
k = 0: By
(2:3), k < T: Let k be the largest such date. Then Hk+1 + 
L
k+1 > 0 and q

k+1 = q

k for
 2 fH;Lg. If Hk+1 > 0; i.e., o¤ering rHk+1 is optimal, then
V Bk+1 = (q
H
k+1u
H + qLk+1u
L   cH) + (1  ) V Bk+2:
Since V Bk+1  V Bk+2 (because the payo¤ to o¤ering a negligible price is V Bk+2), then
qHk+1u
H + qLk+1u
L   cH  V Bk+1:
And since qk+1 = q

k for  2 fH;Lg; V Bk+1 > 0 (by L1:3) and  < 1, then
qHk u
H + qLk u
L   cH = qHk+1uH + qLk+1uL   cH  V Bk+1 > V Bk+1:
Therefore a negligible price o¤er at k is not optimal, which contradicts that Hk +
L
k =
0. Hence Hk+1 = 0 and thus 
L
k+1 > 0:
Since Hk = 0, then
V Lk+1 = 
L
k+1
 
rLk+1   cL

+
 
1  Lk+1

V Lk+2 = V
L
k+2:
Then
rLk = c
L + V Lk+1  cL + V Lk+1 = cL + V Lk+2 = rLk+1:
Since Lk+1 > 0; i.e., price o¤ers of r
L
k+1 are optimal at date k + 1, we have
qLk+1(u
L   rLk+1) +
 
1  qLk+1

V Bk+2  V Bk+2:
Hence
V Bk+2  uL   rLk+1
and
V Bk+1 = q
L
k+1(u
L   rLk+1) +
 
1  qLk+1

V Bk+2  uL   rLk+1:
Since Hk + 
L
k = 0; then the payo¤ to a negligible o¤er at date k is greater or equal
to the payo¤ to a low price o¤er at date k, i.e.,
V Bk+1  qLk
 
uL   rLk

+
 
1  qLk

V Bk+1:
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Thus uL   rLk  V Bk+1: Since V Bk+1 > 0 (by L1:3) and  < 1, then
uL   rLk  V Bk+1 < V Bk+1  uL   rLk+1;
i.e., rLk+1 < r
L
k , which is a contradiction. Hence 
H
k +
L
k > 0 for all k, which establishes
(2:1).
We prove (2:2): Since qH1 = q
H < q by assumption and V B2 > 0 by L1:3; then
qH1 u
H + qL1 u
L   cH < 0 < V B2 :
Hence o¤ering cH at date 1 is not optimal; i.e., H1 = 0: Therefore 
L
1 > 0 by (2:1):
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that properties (3:1); (3:2) and (3:3) together
with the equilibrium conditions provide a system of equations that uniquely determine
a DE; i.e., we show that this system has a unique solution, which we calculate. This
solution provides the strategy distribution, (H ; L; rH ; rL), as well as the sequences
of tradersexpected utilities, and the sequences of stocks and fractions of sellers of
each type. We then calculate payo¤ and the surplus.
Let (H ; L; rH ; rL) be a DE satisfying properties (3:1); (3:2) and (3:3): We show
that such a DE exists and is unique. Since HT > 0 and 
L
T > 0 by (3:3), and since
rHT = c
H and rLT = c
L by DE:H and DE:L, then
qHT u
H + qLTu
L   cH = qLT (uL   cL);
by DE:B, i.e.,
qHT u
H + (1  qHT )uL   cH = (1  qHT )(uL   cL):
Hence
qHT =
cH   cL
uH   cL = q^:
Thus, a buyers expected utility at T is
V BT = (1  q^)(uL   cL):
Since 1  Ht   Lt > 0 for all t < T by (3:1) and (3:2), then V Bt = V Bt+1 for t < T by
DE:B; and therefore for all t we have
V Bt = 
T t (1  q^) (uL   cL): (4)
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Moreover, since Ht > 0 and 1  Ht   Lt > 0 for 1 < t < T by (3:2), then
qHt (u
H   cH) + (1  qHt )(uL   cH) = V Bt+1
by DE:B. Hence for 1 < t < T we have
qHt =
cH   uL + T t(1  q^)(uL   cL)
uH   uL : (5)
Since Lt > 0 and 1  Ht   Lt > 0 for t < T by (3:1) and (3:2), then
qLt
 
uL   rLt

+ (1  qLt )V Bt+1 = V Bt+1;
by DE:B, i.e.,
V Bt+1 = u
L   rLt : (6)
Hence for t < T we have
rLt = u
L   T t(1  q^)(uL   cL): (7)
Since rLt   cL = V Lt+1 for all t by DE:L; then
uL   cL   T t(1  q^)(uL   cL) = V Lt+1:
Reindexing we get
V Lt =
uL   cL

  T t(1  q^)(uL   cL); (8)
for t > 1: And since H1 = 0 by Proposition (2:2), then
V L1 = V
L
2 =
 
1  T 1 (1  q^)  uL   cL : (9)
Since rLt   cL = V Lt+1 for all t by DE:L; we can write the expected utility of a
low quality seller as
V Lt = 
H
t (c
H   cL) + (1  Ht )V Lt+1;
i.e.,
V Lt   V Lt+1 = Ht (cH   cL   V Lt+1):
Using equation (8), then for 1 < t < T we have
V Lt   V Lt+1 =

1  

 
uL   cL :
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Hence 
1  

 
uL   cL = Ht (cH   cL   V Lt+1):
Using again equation (8) and solving for Ht yields
Ht =
1  

uL   cL
cH   uL + T t(1  q^)(uL   cL) (10)
for 1 < t < T: Clearly Ht > 0: Further, since 
 
cH   uL > (1  )  uL   cL by
assumption, then
Ht <
1  

uL   cL
cH   uL < 1:
Since rT = cL by DE:L, then
V LT = 
H
T (c
H   cL):
Hence using (8) for t = T we have
uL   cL

  (1  q^)(uL   cL) = HT (cH   cL):
Solving for HT yields
HT = (1  (1  q^))
uL   cL
 (cH   cL) : (11)
Since 0 < 1   (1  q^) < 1 and   cH   cL > uL   cL, then 0 < HT < 1:
Finally, we compute L: For each t we have
qHt+1 =
(1  Ht )qHt
(1  Ht )qHt + (1  (Lt + Ht ))qLt
:
Solving for Lt we obtain
Lt = (1  Ht )
qHt+1   qHt
qHt+1 (1  qHt )
(12)
for t < T: Since 1  qHt+1  qHt > 0 and Ht < 1; then Lt > 0: Since cH   uL >
(1  )(uL   cL) by assumption, using (5) we have
qHt+1   qHt
qHt+1 (1  qHt )
=
(1  )T t 1(1  q^)(uL   cL)
cH   uL + T t 1(1  q^)(uL   cL)

uH   uL
uH   cH   T t(1  q^)(uL   cL)

< (1  )(1  q^)(u
L   cL)
cH   uL

uH   uL
uH   cH   (1  q^)(uL   cL)

= (1  ) u
L   cL
cH   uL
< 1
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for t > 1: Hence Lt < 1: And since 
 
1  qH q^ > 1  qH by assumption, using (12)
and noticing that H1 = 0 by Proposition (2.2), and q
H
2  q^ as shown above we have
L1 =
qH2   qH
qH2  (1  qH)
<
qH2   qH
qH2

1  qH
q^
 = qH2   qH
qH2   qH q
H
2
q^
< 1:
Finally, LT + 
H
T = 1 implies
LT = 1  HT = 1  (1  (1  q^))
uL   cL
 (cH   uL) : (13)
Since 0 < HT < 1 as shown above, we have 0 < 
L
T < 1.
Using equations (4) and (9), and noticing that qH + qL = 1; we can calculate the
surplus as
SDE =

mL + T 1mH (1  q^)  uL   cL :  (14)
Lemmas 2 and 3 establish properties of DE when frictions are small. These results
are used in the proof of Proposition 4. Recall that our assumptions imply that
qH < q < q^ < 1:
Lemma 2. Assume T 1(cH   cL) > uL   cL and    1  qH q^   q^ + qH (cH  
cL) > qH (1  q^) (uL   cL), and let (H ; L; rH ; rL) be a DE. Then for all t 2
f1;. . . ; Tg:
(L2:1) Ht < 1.
(L2:2) Lt < 1.
(L2:3) HT > 0; 
L
T > 0; and q
H
T = q^.
(L2:4) V Lt > 0.
(L2:5) Lt > 0.
(L2:6) Ht < 
H :=
uL   cL
 (cH   cL) :
Proof: We prove L2:1:
Since H1 = 0 by Proposition 2.2, then assume by way of contradiction that 
H
t = 1
for some t > 1: Since V Lt+1  0; then
V Lt = (c
H   cL) + (1  ) V Lt+1  (cH   cL):
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Since t 1  T 1 and since T 1  cH   cL > uL   cL by assumption, and V Lt 
V Lt+1 for all t (because a low quality seller obtains a payo¤ of V
L
t+1 by choosing a
reservation price rLt > c
H), the inequality above implies
rL1 = c
L + V L2  cL + t 1V Lt  cL + T 1
 
cH   cL > cL + uL   cL = uL:
Therefore o¤ering rL1 at date 1 is suboptimal, i.e., 
L
1 = 0: Since 
H
1 = 0, then
H1 + 
L
1 = 0; which contradicts Proposition 2.1. Hence 
H
t < 1:
We prove L2:2:We rst show that Lt < 1 for t < T: Assume that 
L
t = 1 for some
t < T: By assumption



 
1  qH q^   q^ + qH (cH   cL) > qH (1  q^) (uL   cL);
which we may write as
1    1  qH < 1  (1  q^) (uL   cL)
(cH   cL)

qH
q^
:
Since 
 
cH   cL >   cH   cL > uL   cL, then q^ < 1 implies
0 < 1  (1  q^) u
L   cL
 (cH   uL) < 1:
Hence
1  (1  qH) < q
H
q^
;
and therefore
qH + (1  )(1  qH) = 1  (1  qH) < q
H
q^
:
Since Lt = 1
qHt+1 =
mHt
mHt + (1  )mLt
=
qHt
qHt + (1  )(1  qHt )
:
Since x=[x + (1   )(1   x)] is increasing in x and qHT  qHt+1  qH1 = qH by L1:4;
then the above inequality implies
qHT  qHt+1 
qH
qH + (1  )(1  qH) > q^:
Hence
qHT u
H + qLTu
L   cH > q^uH + (1  q^)uL   cH
= (1  q^) (uL   cL)
> qLT (u
L   cL);
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i.e., o¤ering rLT = c
L at date T is not optimal. Hence LT = 0; and therefore 
H
T = 1
by Proposition 2.3, which contradicts L2:1: Hence Lt < 1 for all t < T:
We show that LT < 1: Assume that 
L
T = 1. Then q
H
T  q^ (since otherwise an o¤er
of rLT is suboptimal); V
L
T = 0 and V
B
T = q
L
T
 
uL   cL : Hence rLT 1 = cL by DE:L,
and
qLT 1(u
L   rLT 1) + qHT 1V BT = qLT 1(uL   cL) + (1  qLT 1)V BT
> qLT 1V
B
T + (1  qLT 1)V BT
= V BT ;
i.e., the payo¤to o¤ering rLT 1 at date T 1 is greater than that of o¤ering a negligible
price. Therefore LT 1 + 
H
T 1 = 1. Since q
H
T 1  qHT by L1:4 and qHT  q^; then the
payo¤ to o¤ering rHT 1 = c
H at T   1 is
qHT 1u
H + qLT 1u
L   cH  qHT uH + qLTuL   cH
 qLT (uL   cL)
 qLT 1(uL   cL)
< qLT 1(u
L   cL) + qHT 1V BT ;
where the last term is the payo¤ to o¤ering rLT 1 = c
L at T   1. Hence HT 1 = 0;
and therefore LT 1 = 1, which contradicts that 
L
t < 1 for all t < T as shown above.
Hence LT < 1.
We prove L2:3: Proposition 2.3, L2:1 and L2:2 imply that HT > 0 and 
L
T > 0:
Since both high price o¤ers and low price o¤ers are optimal at date T; and reservation
prices are rHT = c
H and rLT = c
L; we have
qHT u
H + qLTu
L   cH = qLT (uL   cL):
Thus, using qLT = 1  qHT and solving for qHt yields
qHT =
cH   cL
uH   cL = q^:
We prove L2:4 by induction. By L2:3; V LT = 
H
T
 
cH   cL > 0: Since V Lt  V Lt+1
for all t  T; then V Lt  T tV LT > 0:
We prove L2:5: Suppose by way of contradiction that Lt = 0 for some t: Since
LT > 0 by L2:3; then t < T: Also 
L
t = 0 implies 
H
t > 0 by Proposition 2.1.
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Since Ht < 1 by L2:1; then buyers are indi¤erent at date t between o¤ering c
H or a
negligible price, i.e.,
qHt u
H + qLt u
L   cH = V Bt+1:
We show that Ht+1 = 0: Suppose that 
H
t+1 > 0; then
V Bt+1 = 
 
qHt+1u
H + qLt+1u
L   cH+ (1  )V Bt+2:
Hence  < 1 and V Bt+1 > 0 by L1:3 imply
qHt u
H + qLt u
L   cH = V Bt+1 < V Bt+1 = 
 
qHt+1u
H + qLt+1u
L   cH+ (1  )V Bt+2;
But Lt = 0 implies that q
H
t+1 = q
H
t ; and therefore
qHt+1u
H + qLt+1u
L   cH < V Bt+2;
i.e., o¤ering cH at date t + 1 yields a payo¤ smaller than o¤ering a negligible price,
which contradicts that Ht+1 > 0:
Since Ht+1 = 0; then DE:L implies
V Lt+1 = 
L
t+1
 
rLt+1   cL

+
 
1  Lt+1

V Lt+2 = V
L
t+2:
Since V Lt+1 > 0 by L2:4; then V
L
t+2 > 0; and therefore DE:L and  < 1 imply
rLt = c
L + V Lt+1 = c
L + 2V Lt+2 < c
L + V Lt+2 = r
L
t+1:
i.e., rLt < r
L
t+1: We show that this inequality cannot hold, which leads to a contradic-
tion.
Since Ht < 1 by L2:1; then 
L
t = 0 implies 1  Ht   Lt > 0; i.e., negligible price
o¤ers are optimal at date t: Hence at date t the payo¤ to o¤ering rLt must be less
than or equal to the payo¤ to o¤ering a negligible price, i.e.,
qHt V
B
t+1 + q
L
t (u
L   rLt )  V Bt+1:
Using qHt = 1  qLt we may write this inequality as
uL   rLt  V Bt+1:
Likewise, Ht+1 = 0 implies 0 < 
L
t+1 < 1 by Proposition 2.1 and L2:2; and therefore
1   Ht+1   Lt+1 > 0: Hence low and negligible price o¤ers are both optimal at date
t+ 1, and therefore
V Bt+1 = q
L
t+1(u
L   rLt+1) +
 
1  qLt+1

V Bt+2 = V
B
t+2:
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Hence
V Bt+1 = u
L   rLt+1:
Thus,  < 1 and V Bt+1 > 0 by L1:3 imply
uL   rLt  V Bt+1 < V Bt+1 = uL   rLt+1:
Therefore rLt > r
L
t+1, which contradicts r
L
t < r
L
t+1.
We prove L2:6: For t 2 f1; :::; Tg, since V Lt  0, and rLt   cL = V Lt+1 by DE:L;
we have
V Lt = 
 
Ht
 
cH   cL+ Lt  rLt   cL+  1    Ht + Lt  V Lt+1
 Ht
 
cH   cL :
By Proposition 2.2, we have H1 = 0 < 
H : For 1 < t  T; since Lt 1 > 0 by L2:5
(i.e., low price o¤ers are optimal at date t  1) and V Bt 1 > 0 by L1:3, then uL > rLt 1.
Hence
uL   cL > rLt 1   cL = V Lt  Ht
 
cH   cL ;
and therefore
Ht <
uL   cL
 (cH   cL) = 
H : 
Lemma 3. Assume T 1(cH   cL) > uL   cL and    1  qH q^   q^ + qH (cH  
cL) > qH (1  q^) (uL   cL), and let (H ; L; rH ; rL) be a DE. Then Lt + Ht < 1 and
Ht+1 > 0 for all t 2 f1;. . . ; T   1g.
Proof: Let t 2 f1;. . . ; T   1g: We proceed by showing that (i) Ht > 0 implies
Ht + 
L
t < 1, and (ii) 
H
t + 
L
t < 1 implies 
H
t+1 > 0: Then Lemma 3 follows by
induction: Since H1 = 0 by L2:3 and 
L
1 < 1 by L2:2; then 
H
1 +
L
1 < 1; and therefore
H2 > 0 by (ii). Assume that 
H
k +
L
k < 1 and 
H
k+1 > 0 holds for some 1  k < T  1;
we show that Hk+1 + 
L
k+1 < 1 and 
H
k+2 > 0: Since 
H
k+1 > 0; then 
H
k+1 + 
L
k+1 < 1 by
(i), and therefore Hk+2 > 0 by (ii).
We establish (i), i.e., Ht > 0 implies 
H
t + 
L
t < 1. Suppose not; let t < T be the
rst date such that Ht > 0 and 
H
t + 
L
t = 1. Since 
H
t + 
L
t = 1 (i.e., all low quality
sellers matched at date t trade) and qLt = 1   qHt , we may write qHt+1 = (qHt ; Ht ),
where
(x; y) :=
(1  y)x
x+ (1  y)(1  x) :
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Since  is increasing in x and decreasing in y; qHt  qH1 = qH by L1:4; and Ht < H
by L2:6, then
qHt+1 = (q
H
t ; 
H
t ) > (q
H ; H) =
(1  H)qH
(1  H)qH + (1  )(1  qH) :
Since by assumption



 
1  qH q^   q^ + qH (cH   cL) > qH (1  q^) (uL   cL);
using H = (uL   cL)=[(cH   cL)] yields

 
1  qH > 1   1  (1  q^)H qH
q^
:
Then
(1  H)qH + (1  )(1  qH) =  HqH + 1  (1  qH)
<  HqH + 1 

1   1  (1  q^)H qH
q^

= (1  H)q
H
q^
:
Hence
qHt+1 >
(1  H)qH
(1  H)q
H
q^
= q^ = qHT ;
which contradicts L1:4:
Next we prove (ii), i.e., Ht + 
L
t < 1 implies 
H
t+1 > 0. Suppose by way of
contradiction that Ht + 
L
t < 1 and 
H
t+1 = 0 for some t < T . Since 
L
t > 0 by L2:5,
then low and negligible o¤ers are optimal at date t. Hence
uL   rLt = V Bt+1:
Since Ht+1 = 0, then
V Lt+1 = V
L
t+2:
Since V Lt+1 > 0 by L2:4 and  < 1,we have
rLt+1 = c
L + V Lt+2 = c
L + V Lt+1 > c
L + V Lt+1 = r
L
t :
Since 0 < Lt+1 < 1 by L2:2 and L2:5 and 
H
t+1 = 0, then 1  Ht+1   Lt+1 > 0; i.e., low
and negligible o¤ers are optimal at t+ 1: Therefore
uL   rLt+1 = V Bt+2:
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Thus,  < 1 and V Bt+1 > 0 by L1:3 imply
uL   rLt = V Bt+1 < V Bt+1 = V Bt+2 = uL   rLt+1;
i.e., rLt > r
L
t+1; which contradicts the inequality above. 
Proof of Propositions 4. We show that conditions (3:1); (3:2); and (3:3) are
satised, and therefore that the equilibrium identied in Proposition 3 is the unique
DE. Now, (3:1) follows from (2:1) and L2:2: Also, (3:2) follows from L2:5 and Lemma
3. And (3:3) follows from L2:3: 
Proof of Proposition 5. For  and  su¢ ciently close to one the conditions of
Proposition 4 hold, and therefore the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is the
unique DE. Since H1 = 0, then
~H1 = lim
(;)!1
H1 = 0:
For 1 < t < T; using (10) above we have
~Ht = lim
(;)!1
Ht = lim
(;)!1
1  

uL   cL
cH   uL + T t(1  q^)(uL   cL) = 0:
Also (11) yields
~HT = lim
(;)!1
HT = q^
uL   cL
cH   cL =
uL   cL
uH   cL :
Since uH > uL > cL by assumption, then 0 < ~HT < 1:
From (5) we have for 1 < t < T
lim
(;)!1
qHt = lim
(;)!1
cH   uL + T t(1  q^)(uL   cL)
uH   uL = q^:
Also qHT = q^ implies
lim
(;)!1
qHT = q^:
Then (12) yields
~L1 = lim
(;)!1
(1  H1 )
qH2   qH1
qH2 (1  qH1 )
=
q^   qH
q^ (1  qH) ;
and for 1 < t < T we have
~Lt = lim
(;)!1
(1  Ht )
qHt+1   qHt
qHt+1 (1  qHt )
= 0:
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Also
~LT = lim
(;)!1
LT = lim
(;)!1
 
1  HT

= 1  ~HT :
Thus, 0 < ~HT < 1 implies 0 < ~
L
T < 1:
As for the tradersexpected utilities, (4) implies
~V B1 = lim
(;)!1
V B1 = lim
(;)!1
T 1 (1  q^) (uL   cL) = (1  q^)(uL   cL);
and (9) implies
~V L1 = lim
(;)!1
V L1 = lim
(;)!1
 
1  T 1 (1  q^) (uL   cL) = q^(uL   cL):
Since V Ht = 0; then
~V Ht = lim
(;)!1
V Ht = 0:
Finally, using (14) we get
lim
(;)!1
SDE = lim
(;)!1

mL(uL   cL) +mHT 1(1  q^)(uL   cL)
= mL(uL   cL) +mH(1  q^)(uL   cL)
= ~S: 
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that T = 1 and frictions are small. We show
that the strategy distribution (^H ; ^L; r^H ; r^L) given by r^Ht = c
H , r^Lt = u
L for all t;
^H1 = 0;
^L1 =
q   qH
(1  qH)q ;
and ^Lt = 0;
^Ht = (1  )
uL   cL
(cH   uL)
for t > 1 forms a DE. Since (1   qH)q > q   qH , then 0 < ^L1 < 1; and since
(cH   uL) > (1  )(uL   cL) by assumption, then 0 < ^Ht < 1 for all t > 1.
Since r^Ht = c
H and r^Lt = u
L, then the (maximum) expected utility of high quality
sellers is V Ht = 0 for all t. Hence r^
H
t = c
H for all t satises DE:H. For t > 1 the
expected utility of low quality sellers is
V Lt =
uL   cL

:
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Hence r^Lt = u
L satises DE:L for t > 1: For t = 1 we have r^L1 = c
L + V L2 = u
L.
Hence r^L1 = u
L satises DE:L: Also
V L1 = ^
L
1 (u
L   cL) + (1  ^L1 )V L2 = uL   cL:
Using ^H1 and ^
L
1 we have
qH2 =
qH
qH + (1  ^L1 )(1  qH)
= q:
And since ^Lt = 0 for t > 1; then q
H
t = q
H
2 = q: Hence
qHt (u
H   cH) + (1  qHt )(uL   cH) = 0
for t > 1; and therefore o¤ering the high price (cH) leads to zero instantaneous payo¤
for all t > 1. Since qH1 < q by assumption, then o¤ering the high price (c
H) at t = 1
leads to a negative instantaneous payo¤. Also since r^Lt = u
L for all t, then o¤ering
the low price (uL) yields a zero instantaneous payo¤. Thus, the buyers maximum
expected utility is zero at all dates, i.e., V Bt = 0 for all t: Hence the sequence of price
o¤ers (^H ; ^Lt ) dened above satises DE:B:
Therefore the given strategy distribution is a DE. 
Proof of Remark 3. We calculate the cost of a subsidy  > 0 on low quality, and
show that it approaches mL from below as  approaches 1. For  < 1 and  > 0,
denote this cost by C(). Then
C() = L1m
L
1 +
1X
t=2
t 1Ht m
L
t :
Since Ht is independent of t for t > 1 by Proposition 6.3, denote 
H
t = 
H . Also, we
have mL1 = m
L; and mLt = (1  L1 )(1  H)t 2mL for t > 1: Hence
C() = mL
 
L1 + 
H(1  L1 )
1X
t=2
t 1(1  H)t 2
!
= mL
 
L1 + 
H(1  L1 )
1X
t=1
t(1  H)t 1
!
:
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Since
1X
t=1
t(1  H)t 1 = 1
(1  H)
1X
t=1
 
(1  H)t
=
1
(1  H)
(1  H)
1  (1  H)
=

1  (1  H) ;
then
C() = mLc();
where
c() := L1 + (1  L1 )
H
H + (1  ) :
Since 0 < L1 < 1 and  < 1; then c() is a convex combination of 1 and a number
less than 1. Therefore c() < 1 and C() < mL: Further, since lim!1 c() = 1; then
lim!1C() = mL. 
In lemmas 4 and 5 we establish some properties of dynamic competitive equilibria.
Lemma 4. In every CE, (p; u; sH ; sL; d), we have
P
ftjsHt >0g s
L
t < m
L:
Proof. Let (p; u; sH ; sL; d) be a CE. For all t such that sHt > 0 we have
t 1(pt   cH) = vH(p)  0
by (S:2). Hence pt  cH : Also dt > 0 by CE:1; and therefore
vB(p) = t 1(ut   pt)  0
implies 0  ut   pt  ut   cH , i.e., ut  cH = u(q): Thus
sHt
sHt + s
L
t
 q;
i.e.,
(1  q)
X
ftjsHt >0g
sHt  q
X
ftjsHt >0g
sLt :
Since
P
ftjsHt >0g s
H
t  mH , then
(1  q)mH  (1  q)
X
ftjsHt >0g
sHt  q
X
ftjsHt >0g
sLt :
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Since qH = mH=(mH +mL) < q by assumption, then
X
ftjsHt >0g
sLt 
1  q
q
mH <
1  qH
qH
mH =
mL
mH+mL
mH
mH+mL
mH = mL: 
Lemma 5 shows that low quality must trade before high quality.
Lemma 5. Let (p; u; sH ; sL; d) be a CE. If sHt > 0 for some t, then there is t
0 < t
such that sLt0 > 0 = s
H
t0 and 
t0 1(uL   cL)  t 1(cH   cL).
Proof. Let (p; u; sH ; sL; d) be a CE, and assume that sHt > 0: Then 
t 1(pt   cH) =
vH(p)  0 by S:2; and therefore pt  cH :Hence vL(p)  t 1(pt cL)  t 1(cH cL) >
0, and therefore
PT
k=1 s
L
k = m
L by S:3: SinceX
fkjsHk >0g
sLk < m
L
by Lemma 4, then there is t0 such that sLt0 > 0 = s
H
t0 : Hence dt0 > 0 by CE:1,
which implies ut0 = uL by CE:2; and pt0  uL by D:2. Also sLt0 > 0 implies vL(p) =
t
0 1(pt0   cL)  t 1(pt   cL) by S:2. Thus
t
0 1(uL   cL)  t0 1(pt0   cL)  t 1(pt   cL)  t 1(cH   cL):
Since uL < cH this inequality implies t0 < t: 
Proof of Proposition 8. The prole in Proposition 8 is clearly a CE.
Assume that uL   cL < T 1(cH   cL): We show that every CE, (p; u; sH ; sL; d);
satises p1 = u1 = uL, sL1 = d1 = m
L and sH1 = s
H
t = s
L
t = dt = 0 for t > 1.
We rst show that sHt = 0 for all t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg. Suppose that sHt > 0 for some t.
Then Lemma 5 implies that there is t0 < t such that
uL   cL  t0 1(uL   cL)  t 1(cH   cL)  T 1(cH   cL);
which is a contradiction.
We show that pt  uL for all t. If pt < uL for some t, then
vB(p; u) = max
t2f1;:::;Tg
f0; t 1(ut   pt)g > 0;
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and therefore
PT
t=1 dt = m
B = mH +mL. However, sHt = 0 for all t implies
TX
t=1
(sHt + s
L
t )  mL < mL +mH =
TX
t=1
dt;
which contradicts CE:1.
Since pt  uL for all t, then
vL(p) = max
t2f1;:::;Tg
f0; t 1(pt   cL)g > 0;
and therefore
PT
t=1 s
L
t = m
L by S:3:
We now show that p1 = uL and sL1 = d1 = m
L and sLt = 0 for t > 1. Let t be such
that sLt > 0. Then s
H
t = 0 implies ut = u
L. By CE:1 we have dt = sLt > 0 and thus
t 1(ut   pt) = t 1(uL   pt)  0
by D:2. This inequality and pt  uL imply that pt = uL. Hence for all t such that
sLt > 0 we have pt = u
L.
Let t > 1 and assume that sLt > 0. Then pt = u
L. Since  < 1 and as shown
above p1  uL, then
p1   cL > t 1(uL   cL) = t 1(pt   cL);
which contradicts S:2. Hence sLt = 0 for t > 1, and therefore
PT
t=1 s
L
t = m
L implies
sL1 = d1 = m
L > 0; and p1 = uL. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Assume that T  eT . We show that the prole (p; u; sH ; sL; d)
given by pt = ut = uL for t < eT ; and pt = ut = uH for t  eT ; sH1 = 0; sL1 = mL = d1;
sLeT = 0; sHeT = deT = mH ; and sHt = sLt = dt = 0 for t =2 f1; eTg is a CE.
Since p eT = uH > cH , then vH(p)   eT 1(p eT   cH) > 0. Further, since  < 1 then

eT 1(p eT   cH) =  eT 1(uH   cH) > t 1(pt   cH)
for t 6= eT . Hence sH 2 SH(p). For low quality sellers,  < 1 and uL   cL 

eT 1(uH   cH) imply
vL(p) = p1   cL = uL   cL  t 1(pt   cH)
for t > 1. Hence sL 2 SL(p). For buyers,
vB(p; u) = t 1(ut   pt) = 0
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for all t: Hence d 2 D(p; u). Finally, sLt + sHt = dt for all t, and therefore CE:1 is
satised, and u1 = uL and ueT = uH satisfy CE:2: Thus, the prole dened is a CE.
The surplus in this CE is
SCE = mL(uL   cL) +mH eT 1(uH   cH). 
Proof of Proposition 10. Assume that T =1: Let  < 1: The surplus at the CE
dened in Proposition 9 is
SCE() = qL(uL   cL) + qH eT () 1(uH   cH):
By denition eT () satises

eT () 1(uH   cL)  uL   cL <  eT () 2(uH   cL):
i.e.,
 <
uH   cL
uL   cL 
eT () 1  1
Hence
lim
!1
 =
uH   cL
uL   cL lim!1 
eT () 1 = 1;
i.e.,
lim
!1

eT () 1 = uL   cL
uH   cL = (1  q^)
uL   cL
uH   cH :
Substituting, we have
lim
!1
S^CE() =

mL +mH(1  q^) (uL   cL) = ~S: 
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Figure 2(c): Proportion of High Quality in the Market
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Figure 2(a): High Quality Stocks
α=δ=.99
α=δ=.95
α=δ=.8
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
mtL
Date
Figure 2(b): Low Quality Stocks
α=δ=.99
α=δ=.95
α=δ=.8
